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FROM CAVEAT EMPTOR TO STRICT LIABILITY: A 
REVIEW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN FLORIDA 
RICHARD C. AUSNESS" 
Since the doctrine of caveat emptor1 gave way to a more enlightened 
response,2 the courts have struggled to place the law of products liability on 
a proper doctrinal foundation. Negligence, implied warranty, and strict 
liability have been used,3 but as yet no universally accepted theory has 
emerged.4 In light of this problem this article will trace the development of 
seller's liability in Florida. Special emphasis will be placed upon implied 
warranty;5 in addition, the relationship between existing Florida case law, 
strict liability under the Restatement of Torts~6 and the warranty provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code7 will be examined. 
Breach of warranty was originally tortious in nature and similar to 
deceit.8 During the eighteenth century the action in assumpsit based on ex-
press warranty evolved.9 The implied warranty of merchantability was first 
recognized in 1815,10 while the implied warranty of fitness appeared later.ll 
• B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of Florida; Assistant Professor of Law, University of 
Florida. 
1. See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133 
(1931). 
2. "Modern products liability law proclaims the death of caveat emptor and the eco-
nomic background it once reflected: a miscellany of sellers and buyers bargaining with 
each other in circumstances of relatively equal financial power and technical sophistication." 
Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability - With a Close Look at Section 402A and the 
Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439, 440 (1969). 
3. In this article the term "implied warranty" will be used in connection with liability 
arising out of a sale, irrespective of such liability being limited by privity. The term "strict 
liability" will apply exclusively to strict liability in tort under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §402A (1965). 
4. There are literally hundreds of articles on the subject of products liability. Some 
of the most recent ones include: Dewey, Products Liability Without Privity: Contract, 
Warranty or Tort, 45 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 76 (1970); Prosser, Products Liability in Per· 
spective, 5 GONZAGA L. REv. 157 (1970); Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict Products 
Liability, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 772 (1970); Note, Products Liability: A Synopsis, 30 
OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1969). 
5. The two basic warranties in the law of sales are merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose. The warranty of merchantability states that the product is of average 
quality and fit for the ordinary purposes for which such products are used. UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314. The warranty of fitness states that the product is suitable for a 
particular purpose where the seller is aware of the purpose and the buyer relies on the 
seller's judgment. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-315. 
6. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965). 
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-314 to -318. 
8. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1888); Wade, Strict Tort 
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). 
9. Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). 
10. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (H.L.1815). 
11. See Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868). 
[410] 
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During the nineteenth century the leading English Case, Winterbottom v. 
Wrightp was interpreted by American courts to limit the seller's liability 
for defective products, even in tort,13 to those in privity with him.14 The 
privity requirement continued until 1916 when the celebrated opinion of 
Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.15 dismissed privity from 
products liability actions in negligence. The MacPherson decision was ac-
corded immediate acceptance16 and has been universally followed.17 Its 
reasoning has been extended to members of the purchaser's family,18 em-
ployees,l9 subsequent purchasers,2o others users of the chattel,21 and by-
standers,22 as well as to property damage.23 Although the plaintiff's burden 
in negligence was eased by a constant tightening of the seller's standard of 
care24 and by liberal use of res ipsa loquitur,25 considerable pressure remained 
for the application of some principle of liability without fault. 
In 1913, after prolonged agitation over unwholesome food, Washington,26 
followed by Kansas,27 Mississippi,28 and other states,29 dispensed with the re-
quirement of privity where food was involved. Numerous theories were offered 
to justify the imposition of liability upon sellers in the absence of both negli-
gence and privity of contract. Finally, in 1927 the Mississippi court proposed 
12. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The case held that the breach of a contract to keep 
a mailcoach in repair after it was sold could give no cause of action in contract to a pas-
senger in the coach who was injured when it collapsed. See W. PROSSER, TORTS §93, at 622 
(4th ed. 1971). 
13. E.g., Stone v. Van Noy R.R. News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S.W. 1092 (1913); Lebourdais 
v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907); Liggett &: Myers Tobacco Co. v. 
Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009 (1915); Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 
Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912); Hasbrouck v. Armour &: Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N.W. 157 
(1909). 
14. See generally Comment, The Contractual Aspects of Consumer Protection: Recent 
Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1430 (1965). 
15. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
16. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 59 YALE 
L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960). 
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §96, at 643. 
18. E.g., Baker v. Sears Roebuck &: Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936). 
19. E.g., Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 235 N.Y. 227, 14(1 N.E. 571 (1923). 
20. E.g., Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co, 157 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y.S. 131 (3d Dep't 
1915). 
21. E.g., Carpini v. Pittsburgh &: Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); Reed 
&: Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934). 
22. E.g., Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 258 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1953); McLeod v. Linde 
Air Prod. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927); Hopper v. Charles Cooper &: Co., 104 
N.J.L. 93, 139 A. 19 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1927). 
23. E.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 609 (D. Me. 1947). 
24. Keeton, Recent Decisions and Developments in the Law of Products Liability, 32 
INS. COUNSEL J. 620, 620-23 (1965). 
25. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 899 (1967). 
26. Mazetti v. Armour &: Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). 
27. Parks v. G.C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914). 
28. Jackson Coca·Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914). 
29. Epstein, Strict Liability in Tort: A Modest Proposal, 70 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 9 (1967); 
Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 193, 205-06 (1961). 
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the idea of an implied warranty running with the goods from the manufac-
turer to the consumer similar to a covenant running with land.30 This propo-
sition was later discarded for the theory of an implied warranty made directly 
to the consumer,31 but since that time implied warranty3Z has served as the 
basis of a seller's liability for food as well as other products.33 
A warranty, implied from the nature of the transaction34 or the relative 
situations of the parties,35 arises by operation of law, irrespective of the seller's 
intention.36 However, it is still associated with contract31 principles such as 
privity.as Warranty, to the extent it is available to the litigant, is superior to 
negligence because it imposes a form of liability without fault upon the 
seller of goods.39 Defenses such as contributory negligence40 and assumption 
of risk41 are not entirely effective, since the defendant's standard of care is 
not normally at issue. The privity requirement has also been circumvented 
in a number of cases holding that commercial advertising and labeling 
techniques of manufacturers give rise to express warranties upon which the 
30. Coca·Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927). 
31. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. 
REV. 791, 800·01 (1966). 
32. See Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness jor a Particular Purpose, 1958 WIS. 
L. REV. 219; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. 
REv. 117 (1943). 
33. Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 
16 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 494-500 (1962); Prosser, supra note 4, at 160. 
34. Implied warranty has been extended in some instances to services and to sales or 
rentals of real property. Note, Product Liability for a Defective House, 18 CLEV.·ST. L. REV. 
319 (1969); Note, Products Liability at the Threshhold of the Landlord·Lessor, 21 HASTINGS 
L.J. 458 (1970); Note, Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly "Service" Trans-
actions, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 580 (1970). 
35. Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 501, 
506 (1964). 
36. Prosser, supra note 32, at 123-24; Comment, Implied Warranty: Disclaimer In-
effective, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 433, 434 (1967). 
37. The mixed nature of implied warranty has created numerous problems. The Florida 
supreme court in Whiteley v. Webb's City, 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951), held that the state 
wrongful death act would support actions in tort but not in contract and denied recovery 
under the statute for breach of warranty. In 1953, however, the statute was changed to 
include actions ex contractu. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28280, §1, at 934 (now FLA. STAT. §768.01 (2) 
(1969». See also FLA. STAT. §768.03 (2) (1969) (wrongful death to minors). But see Public 
Administrator of New York County v. CurtiSS-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (D.C.N.Y. 
1963). Another problem area is the applicable statute of limitations period. Creviston v. 
General Motors Corp., 210 So. 2d 755 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968). See LoPucki, Statute of Limi-
tations in Warranty, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1969); Note, Statutes of Limitations: Their 
Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1970). Cf. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-725. 
38. Prosser, supra note 31, at 801. 
39. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §103, at 671. 
40. See also Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability 
in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 631 (1968); Note, Contributory Negligence in Warranty 
Law, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 85 (1962). 
41. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122 (1961). 
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ultimate consumer is entitled to rely.42 Thus, the plaintiff's chances of pre-
vailing are somewhat better when the suit proceeds under warranty theory.43 
A third form of products liability has rejected warranty language entirely 
and has predicated liability purely in tort.44 This was first proposed in the 
Restatement of Torts45 and was applied by the California supreme court in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power P1"OductsJ Inc.46 Strict liability is regarded by some 
authorities as superior to implied warranty because it avoids such pitfalls as 
privity, disclaimers, and other unwanted legacies of the law of sales.47 
IMPLIED WARRANTY AND FOOD 
For many years Florida has used warranty as a basis of recovery in con-
tract.48 The doctrine first appeared in a personal injury context in Smith v. 
Burdine'sJ Inc.49 where the plaintiff suffered internal injuries after using a 
brand of lipstick. purchased in reliance upon a saleswoman's assurance that 
the product was safe. The court held that the employee's conduct gave rise to 
an implied warranty of fitness and the plaintiff was allowed to recover from 
the retailer, since the parties were in privity.50 
Florida also followed the lead of other states51 in discarding privity in 
cases involving food. In Blanton v. Cudahy Packing CO.52 the Florida supreme 
court held the manufacturer of food products liable for injuries sustained by 
a consumer, even though no privity was established betw'een the parties. In 
that case the plaintiff became seriously ill after consuming a foreign substance 
in a canned meat product processed by the defendant. Despite the lack. of 
privity between the parties, the court allowed the action, concluding that the 
42. E.g., Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1948); 
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Simpson v. 
American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 
P.2d 409 (1932). See also Comment, Implied Warranty - Sales by Retailers - Third Party 
Beneficiary, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 758, 762 (1962). 
43. Keeton, Products Liability -Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. 
L.J.26 (1965). 
44. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 9 (1965). 
45. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965). 
46. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). 
47. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 
TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965). 
48. E.g., West Coast Lumber Co. v. Wernicke, 137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357 (1939); 
Berger v. E. Berger & Co., 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918). See Parkinson & Sanders, Implied 
Warranty in Florida, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 241, 251-53 (1959). 
49. 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940). 
50. See also West Coast Lumber Co. v. Wernicke, 137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357 (1939) (sale 
of seed by name); American Mfg. Co. v. McLeod & Co., 78 Fla. 162, 82 So. 802 (1919) (sale 
by sample). 
51. Prosser, supra note 16, at 1103. 
52. 154 FIa. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944). 
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"implied warranty theory of liability comports with the general trend of the
best reasoned cases." 53
Once liability under implied warranty for the manufacturers of food
products was established,54 the responsibilities of retailers in the absence of
privity soon underwent examination. Sencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc.55 in-
volved a plaintiff who was poisoned by the contents of a can of sardines pur-
chased from the defendant's store. The seller maintained it was more equitable
to place the duty of inspection on the manufacturer because only the manu-
facturer could ascertain the contents of the sealed container.56 Nevertheless,
the court declared that the sale of food, even in sealed containers, was sub-
ject to an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption, which inured
to the benefit of the ultimate consumer.57 Although the dissenting opinion
argued that this would impose an excessive burden upon small businessmen,
the majority responded that retailers could protect themselves by dealing only
with reputable suppliers who were susceptible to suit in the state.58
When the question of liability initially arose for unwholesome food con-
sumed in a restaurant, many courts denied recovery based upon implied war-
ranty.59 The courts, which used the negligence theory, considered serving
meals to be a service rather than a sale,60 and thus reflected the era of the
boarding house where meals were included with the room.61 This approach,
however, proved to be unsuitable to the modern practice of purchasing meals
in a restaurant where each item was separately priced.62
The Florida supreme court, in Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp.,63 re-
fused to make the technical distinction between a sale and a service and held
the defendant liable to consumers under the implied warranty theory.64 A
later case, however, declined to find liability where the plaintiff contracted
53. Id. at 876, 19 So. 2d at 316.
54. See also Wagner v. Mars, Inc., 166 So. 2d 673 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) (pin in candy
bar).
55. 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950).
56. 45 So. 2d at 672-73. See IV. PROSSER, supra note 12, §95, at 631.
57. 45 So. 2d at 673. The common law warranty of fitness for human consumption in
connection with food products is treated as an implied warranty of merchantability under
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314(1).
58. The court indicated that a retailer, who was held liable under these circum-
stances, might thereupon bring suit against the manufacturer for breach of warranty.
Cf. UNIFORM COMMEaCIAL CODE §2-607.
59. E.g., Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 A. 533 (1914); Goodwin v. Country Club
of Peoria, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944); Stewart v. Martin, 353 Mo. 1, 181 S.W.2d
657 (1944); Nisky v. Childs, 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 A. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
60. E.g., Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 117 Conn. 128, 167 A. 99 (1933).
61. See Comment, Sales-Implied Warranty of Fitness in Sale of Food by Restaurant,
3 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 638 (1949).
62. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314 (1).
63. 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
64. This approach is known as the Massachusetts-New York rule. See Friend v. Childs
Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918); Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144
N.E. 635 (1924).
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food poisoning at a church fundraising dinner where the defendant, a pro-
fessional caterer and member of the church, had gratuitously assisted in the
preparation of the food.65
While most injuries involving food are caused by foreign impurities,
liability may occasionally depend upon whether the presence of a particular
substance constituted a breach of warranty.66 For example, in Zabner v.
Howard Johnson's, Inc.67 the plaintiff suffered injuries to his gums and teeth
when he bit into a piece of walnut shell contained in maple walnut ice cream.
The lower court gave judgment for the defendant on the theory that the
walnut shell was natural to the product sold and could not be called a foreign
substance.68 The appellate court rejected the foreign-natural test in favor
of the reasonable expectation test,69 holding that the ice cream was reasonably
fit if particles of walnut shell in the product should have been anticipated
and guarded against by the consumer.70
Many jurisdictions extended the protection of implied warranty from food
to products for intimate bodily use,71 such as polio vaccine,72 soap,73 de-
tergent,7 4 and clothing.7 5 In Florida, however, the first move in this direction
involved containers of products for human consumption.76 Other jurisdictions
had also attempted to distinguish between food and containers. 77 The first
65. Wentzel v. Berliner, 204 So. 2d 905 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
66. See Prosser, supra note 31, at 809-10.
67. 201 So. 2d 824 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
68. Id. at 825. See also Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P-2d 144 (1936); Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App.
2d 41, 245 P.2d 316 (4th Dist. 1952); Silva v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83
P.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1938); Davidson-Paxon Co. v. Archer, 91 Ga. App. 131, 85 S.E.2d 182
(1954); Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949);
Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 323 Il1. App. 1, 54 NE.2d 612 (1944); Brown v. Nebiker,
229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941); Adams v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112
S.E.2d 92 (1960).
69. 201 So. 2d at 827. See also Wood v. Waldorf Sys., Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951);
Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfrs., Inc., 822 Ill. App. 586, 54 N.E.2d 759 (1942); Bryer v.
Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Boneberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile
Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
70. 201 So. 2d at 827.
71. Wade, supra note 44, at 7.
72. E.g., Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. 320 (Ct.
App. 1960).
73. E.g., Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. Ohio 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
74. E.g., Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961). See also Worley v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
75. E.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962). See also Ingalls v. Meissner, 11 Wis. 2d 371, 105 N.W.2d 748 (1960).
76. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953).
77. See, e.g., Soter v. Griesedieck W. Brewing Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Latham v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 175 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). See also Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 486 (1944); McAlester Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Lynch, 280 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1955).
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case, Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,-, was brought by a plaintiff
who had swallowed broken glass contained in a bottle purchased from a soft
drink machine. The court considered whether one who purchased a bottled
soft drink could maintain an action directly against the bottler under im-
plied warranty for injuries sustained as a result of a foreign substance in the
beverage. The resulting judgment for the plaintiff simply extended the
Blanton holding from sealed cans to sealed bottles. 79 In Canada Dry Bottling
Co. v. Shaw,8o however, a purchaser recovered for injuries sustained when
a beverage bottle broke as she attempted to open it. In its discussion the
court suggested that Jordan supported the extension of warranty principles to
containers if the glass particles in the bottle were due to a defective con-
tainer.81 Accordingly, the suit was permitted against both the bottler and the
retailer.
Although the Canada Dry rationale was subsequently used to allow re-
covery against a bottler for injuries resulting from a defective container,8 2
the Florida supreme court, in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.,8 3 refused to extend
the implied warranty concept to retailers for injuries caused by defective con-
tainers. In this case the plaintiff lacerated her wrist while attempting to open
a bottle of reducing pills purchased by her husband. The supreme court,
affirming the district court of appeal's summary judgment for the defendant, 4
stated on the question of retailer liability:85
We are not persuaded that considerations of public policy require
us to extend to food containers the "implied warranty" liability of
retailers as to the food contained therein; on the contrary, we are of
the opinion that it would be unreasonably burdensome to extend
liability in this respect.
Although this holding overruled the Canada Dry doctrine to the extent it
applied to retailers, the court did not indicate whether a bottler was liable
78. 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953).
79. Id. at 911.
80. 118 So. 2d 840 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
81. "It is interesting to note that in the Jordan case . . .the plaintiff was injured while
swallowing broken glass which was contained in the bottle. It does not appear from the
opinion whether the glass was a portion of the bottle itself, or extraneous to it. If the
glass was not an internal portion of the bottle, then the Jordan case must be classified with
those warranty cases concerning foreign substances in prepared food, and its value here is
to show Florida authority for implied warranty and to show that the purchaser can sue
the bottler. On the other hand, however, if the glass that the plaintiff swallowed came from
the bottle itself, then the Jordan case takes on a far stronger meaning in relaion to the
case at bar. It cannot be said that implied warranty would, or should, make a distinction
between a case where the container broke on the inside and a case where the container
broke on the outside and injured the opener." Id. at 843.
82. Renniger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 171 So. 2d 602 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 177
So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1965).
83. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 172 So. 2d 907 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
84. 172 So. 2d 907 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
85. 177 So. 2d at 229.
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for injuries from a defective container. Technically, the Foley case did not
affect the plaintiff's action against the bottler, and the Renniger v. Foremost
Dairies, Inc.86 decision, which had allowed such an action, was not expressly
overruled. The question was ultimately settled when implied warranty was
extended to the manufacturers of all products.8 7
EXTENSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTY TO OTHm PRoDuCrs
In 1958 a Michigan court, in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 8 extended implied warranty without privity to all products.
Within a few years Spence was accepted by a number of courts.89 Florida,
however, limited its application of implied warranty to inherently dangerous
products. In Matthews v. Lawnlite Co. 90 the plaintiff sued the manufacturer
of an aluminum lounge chair, which had amputated the plaintiff's finger as
he was examining the product for possible purchase. The court cited the
Restatement of Torts91 for the proposition that the manufacturer would be
liable in negligence if the product was dangerous due to defective design.
The court apparently extended this reasoning to implied warranty, intro-
ducing the "imminently dangerous" doctrine of MacPherson into the dis-
cussion. The decision ultimately held that a recovery might be grounded on
implied warranty even in the absence of privity.92 Although the cited pro-
vision of the Restatement dealt with negligence, the holding in Matthews has
been applied to both negligence93 and implied warranty cases, 94 but not
without some criticism for lack of doctrinal clarity.95
Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc.99
86. 171 So. 2d 602 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
87. See Gay v. Kelly, 200 So. 2d 568 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967). See also UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE §2-314 (2) (e).
88. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
89. E.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Hinton v.
Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y 1959); Beck v Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,
99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
90. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). Cf. King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
91. "A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he should
expect to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its probable use for bodily
harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or
design." RrsTATEMENT OF TORTS §398 (1934).
92. 88 So. 2d at S01.
93. E.g., Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
94. E.g., Bernstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 177 So. 2d 362 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965),
afJ'd, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1965); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963).
95. Note, Products Liability: Doctrinal Problem and the Restatement's Answer, 17 U.
FLA. L. Rv. 421, 434-35 (1964).
96. 104 So. 2d 40 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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represented significant progress toward universal acceptance of the implied
warranty theory of products liability in Florida. 7 In this case the plaintiff,
a building contractor, purchased electric cable manufactured by the defendant
for underground transmission of high voltage current. The plaintiff relied on
the manufacturer's assertion that the cable was suitable for this purpose, and
when the cable proved to be inadequate the plaintiff was forced to replace it.
Despite the lack of privity with the manufacturer, the purchaser brought
suit on the theory that the implied warranty of fitness had been breached.
After reviewing prior warranty cases the court concluded that the Matthews
decision supported the application of implied warranty to all manufactured
goods. In effect, the court held that a consumer, ultimate user, or purchaser
could recover from a manufacturer, regardless of privity, under an implied
warranty of fitness when he relied on the skill and judgment of the manu-
facturer.98
In Florida the privity rule was further abrogated by Lily-Tulip Cup
Corp. v. Bernstein,9" an action for personal injuries against the manufacturer
based on the implied warranty of merchantability by a consumer not in
privity with the defendant. The plaintiff, a hospital patient, was injured
when a cup manufactured by the defendant came apart spilling its hot con-
tents on her. The trial court refused to apply implied warranty, since the
article was neither a foodstuff nor an inherently dangerous product, but
the district court of appeal, quoting from Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co.,'1°
reversed the trial court and stated: 1° 1
There is a conflict of opinion about the accountability of a manufac-
turer to a consumer on the theory of implied warranty in the absence
of privity, but this court has become aligned with those courts holding
that suit may be brought against the manufacturer notwithstanding
want of privity.
The Lily-Tulip decision was affirmed by the Florida supreme court 0 2 and
has been uniformly followed in cases between consumers and manufacturers
involving the sale of goods. 0 3
The Florida courts, however, have declined to extend the Lily-Tulip de-
cision to retailers. The leading Florida case refusing to hold retailers liable
97. See Comment, Sales-Implied Warranty - Privity Unnecessary, 13 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 252 (1958).
98. 104 So. 2d at 41. See Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1953).
See also West Coast Lumber Co. v. Wernicke, 137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357 (1939); Berger v.
E. Berger & Co., 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918); Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56
Fla. 708, 48 So. 410 (1909).
99. 177 So. 2d 362 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965), aff'd, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966). See generally
Comment, Implied Warranty: Strict Liability of the Manufacturer in Absence of Privity for
All Products, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 193 (1966).
100. 63 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1953).
101. 177 So. 2d at 364.
102. 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966).
103. E.g., Gates & Sons, Inc. v. Brock, 199 So. 2d 291 (lst D.CA. Fla. 1967); Barfield
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under implied warranty for items other than food was Carter v. Hector
Supply Co.,104 which involved a maintenance employee who was injured when
the frame of a riding lawnmower broke beneath him. The district court of
appeal held there could be no liability against the retailer under implied war-
ranty where the defect was equally discoverable by buyer or seller.0 5 The Flor-
ida supreme court held that the absence of privity between the retailer and
plaintiff barred the suit. The court reviewed the inherently dangerous devices
doctrine, but concluded: "There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
commodity involved . . . could in any respect be classified as a dangerous
instrumentality such as an automobile or an airplane."O6 The court also dis-
tinguished the Continental Copper and Matthews cases on the ground that
they involved manufacturers rather than retailers. Likewise, the food cases
were rejected as inapplicable, while Smith v. Burdine's, Inc.OT7 was discarded
because the parties there had been in privity.
While the Carter opinion indicated that an action against the retailer
for negligence might be available if the retailer could be charged with actual
or implied knowledge of the defect, the court concluded by stating: 08
The sum of our holding here simply is that one who is not in privity
with a retailer has no action against him for breach of an implied
warranty, except in situations involving foodstuffs or perhaps dangerous
instrumentalities, a problem not present here. This is the rule for the
reason that a warranty is essentially an aspect of a contractual relation-
ship and will not generally be implied absent such a relationship
between the parties.
The Carter opinion appears to have been followed in later retailer-liability
decisions.10 9 Possible exceptions to this limitation of a retailer's liability, how-
ever, are cases involving third party beneficiaries and inherently dangerous
articles.
In McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp.110 a three-year-old child
whose finger was severed by a swinging "skyrider" brought suit against the
retailer. Since the product had been purchased by the child's parents, there
was no privity with the retailer, and the district court of appeal dismissed
the suit under the authority of the Carter case."13 The Florida supreme court
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 197 So. 2d 545 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Power Ski of Florida,
Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 188 So. 2d 13 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
104. 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
105. 122 So. 22 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
106. 128 So. 2d at 391.
107. 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940).
108. 128 So. 2d at 391.
109. E.g., Odum v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., 196 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Fla. 1961); Brown
v. Hall, 221 So. 2d 454 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Gates & Sons, Inc. v. Brock, 199 So. 2d 291
(1st D.CA. Fla. 1967).
110. 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962). See Comment, Implied Warranty -Sales by Retailers -
Third Party Beneficiary, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 758 (1962).
111. 180 So. 2d 117 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
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reversed and held that the plaintiff's action was not barred by lack of
privity: 1 '2
We think common sense requires the presumption that one in the
position of the minor plaintiff in this cause is a naturally intended and
reasonably contemplated beneficiary of the warranty of fitness for
use or merchantability implied by law, and as such he stands in the
shoes of the purchaser in enforcing the warranty.
This reasoning imputed to the retailer the knowledge that certain goods are
purchased for family as well as for personal use."-3 Strict application of privity
in this context would have virtually absolved all sellers of responsibility
for defective products specifically designed for infants. Since there was little
precedent in Florida for this decision,-1 4 the court was forced to rely upon
authority from other jurisdictions to sustain its position."s However, the
court cautioned that the case did not represent "an infringement or abandon-
ment of the basic principle upon which the requirement of privity in war-
ranty actions is premised: that warranties do not 'run with' personal property
and consequently do not inure to the benefit of third parties who may sub-
sequently acquire proprietary interest in the article warranted." 1 6
It is surprising, considering the factual resemblance to Matthews v. Lawn-
lite,1 ' that the court in McBurnette did not expressly extend to retailers the
inherently dangerous device exception to the privity rule. Carter had implied
this extension and, despite the absence of any express reference to inherently
dangerous products, this arguably might be regarded as an alternative basis
for the McBurnette decision." 81
There seems to be little justification for Florida's continuing adherence
to the privity rules where retailers are concerned. The rationale for holding
retailers liable to the consumer for defective products was articulated by the
California court in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co:" 9
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing
goods to the public. They are an integral part of the overall producing
and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting
from defective products. . . .In other cases the retailer himself may
play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be
112. 137 So. 2d at 566.
113. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318.
114. See Comment, supra note 110, at 764.
115. E.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961); Lindroth v. Walgreen
Co., 329 Il1. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946); Twombler v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476,
158 A.2d 110 (1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Blessington
v. McCroy Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
116. 137 So. 2d at 567.
117. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). See text accompanying notes 90-95 supra.
118. Cf. Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968).
119. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964)
(footnotes omitted).
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in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the re-
tailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict
liability on the manufacturer and the retailer alike affords maximum
protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the de-
fendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them
in the course of their continuing business relationship.
This view has been endorsed by a number of writers 2 0 and courts,' 2 ' although
it has also provoked some criticism.122
Another unsettled question is the status of nonusers who are injured by
defective products. 1 23 The warranty protection under Lily-Tulip extended
only to the consumer or user of the product, 24 and subsequent cases generally
failed to apply it where nonusers were injured.' 25 Recovery was denied, for
example, where the plaintiff, a bystander, was struck in the eye by debris
from a defective electric sander.12 Nationally, there is a split of authority re-
garding liability to nonusers 27 although the trend now appears to be in
favor of nonusers. s8
In Florida, nonusers prevailed in Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co. 29 an
action by occupants of a duplex injured by the explosion of a propane gas
storage tank. Reversing the decision of the district court of appeal,30 the
Florida supreme court allowed all of the injured parties to maintain an action,
since the inherently dangerous device exception to the privity rule extended
liability to all persons in the vicinity of proper use of the product. The
120. E.g., F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, ToRTs §28.30 (1956); S. SemEmER & P. RnmINoor,
PRODuars LABmnrry 2:28 (1967); W. PROSSER, TORTS §101, at 665 (4th ed. 1971); Lascher,
Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S.
CAL. L. REv. 30, 45 (1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MIm. L. Rxv. 791, 800-01 (1966).
121. E.g., Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 247 (Alas. 1969);
Sweeny v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 13-14, 236 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1966); Williams v. Ford
Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
122. See, e.g., Comment, Torts-Strict Liability for Retailers?, 45 WASH. L. Rxv. 431,
435-39 (1970).
123. See Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN.
L. REv. 1 (1970); Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 CoLum L. Rxv. 916
(1964); Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law De-
terminism, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 625 (1971).
124. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318.
125. E.g., Engel v. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 198 So. 2d 93 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1967).
126. Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). This case,
however, involved a suit against the retailer who sold the sander.
127. Cases that have denied recovery include: Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713
(2d Cir. 1966); Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct. 1964); Berzon
v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (4th Dep't 1965).
128. Prosser, Products Liability in Perspective, 5 GONZAGA L. Rav. 157 (1970). The
leading case in this area is Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d
129 (1965). See also Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965).
129. 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968). See Comment, Piercing the Shield of Privity in Products
Liability -A Case for the Bystander, 23 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 266 (1968).
130. 193 So. 2d 669 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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supreme court also rejected the district court's distinction between sales and
bailments and the defendant's liability thereunder. 13 1
DISCLAIMERS OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
The contractual nature of implied warranty has led to considerable con-
fusion over the status of disclaimers. 13 2 Various devices have been employed
to destroy the effect of disclaimers. Some courts have refused to recognize dis-
claimers because they were so ambiguous that the buyer did not realize what
he had given up,133 while others have declined to enforce disclaimers because
they were drafted so as to purposely escape the average buyer's attention. 3 4
The third method used is the "displacement theory," which allows the court
to deny recovery only when the same area is covered by the express warranty,
and thereby displaces a co-existent implied warranty.135 The Florida supreme
court first considered the disclaimer problem in a case involving watermelon
seed."36 A contract between a seed merchant and a farmer contained a dis-
claimer clause.13 When the seed represented to be "black diamond" proved
to be a less valuable variety, the court, apparently applying the displacement
theory, held that the disclaimer did not eliminate an implied warranty as to
the variety. The court, however, added that the disclaimer was sufficient to
exclude any implied warranties relating to quality productiveness. 138
Disclaimer provisions in new car warranties have resulted in substantial
litigation in recent years. Most automobile warranties state that they replace
any other warranties, express or implied, and limit the manufacturer's or
seller's liability to replacement of defective parts. Such disclaimers were
recognized" s9 until Manheim v. Ford Motor Co. 40 where the Florida supreme
131. 208 So. 2d at 617.
132. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966). Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer
Sales, 77 HARv. L. REv. 318 (1963).
133. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (1914). See
also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
134. Celanese Corp. v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954);
Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Il1. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282
(1965); Turner v. Kunde, 256 Iowa 835, 128 N.W.2d 196 (1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Calumet Cheese Co. v. Clhas. Pfizer & Co.,
25 Wis. 2d 55, 130 N.W.2d 290 (1964).
135. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964);
Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Co., 138 So. 2d 777 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
136. Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1953).
137. The sales contract provided: "The Corneli Seed Co. gives no warranty, express or
implied as to description, quality, productiveness, or any other matter . I..." d. at 163.
138. Id. at 164. See also American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1965).
139. See, e.g., Friedman v. Ford Motor Co., 179 So. 2d 371 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Rozen
v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 (3d DC.A. Fla. 1962). But see Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc.,
137 So. 2d 239 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
140. 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); see Comment, Implied Warranty: Disclaimer Ineffec-
tive, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 433 (1967).
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court held that neither the absence of privity between manufacturer and the
purchaser nor the execution of a written agreement between manufacturer
and dealer limiting or disclaiming implied warranties would preclude re-
covery by the purchaser of a new automobile when such warranties were
breached. Manheim concerned an expensive automobile that failed to run
properly notwithstanding numerous repairs by the dealer. The suit was di-
rected against the manufacturer only. The court apparently utilized the
"leaping warranty" concept, 14 1 under which disclaimers are restricted to the
contracting parties14 2 and do not extend to the ultimate consumer. 4
3
A later case, Crown v. Cecil Holland Ford, Inc., 44 permitted an action by
the purchaser against both a manufacturer and dealer for personal injuries
sustained as a result of a defective automobile. Although automobiles are
regarded as dangerous instrumentalities in Florida, 45 the case was apparently
not decided on this basis. Several earlier decisions (not involving disclaimers)
had not allowed suits against dealers 46 on the theory that they merely acted
as agents for the manufacturer as far as the warranty was concerned. In De-
sandolo v. F & C Tractor & Equipment Co.14 7 the seller sought to force pay-
ment on a note given by the purchaser of a bulldozer. The buyer counter-
claimed for breach of implied warranty, but the court held that the written
warranty between the parties in lieu of all other warranties was sufficient to
exclude the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. 48 The Desan-
dolo court distinguished the Manheim case, since it dealt "only with the
effect of a disclaimer in a contract between a manufacturer and its dealer."149
Since the transaction in Desandolo involved the dealer and the purchaser, the
court concluded that the disclaimer was effective. A significant difference
between this case and Crown was that Desandolo did not involve personal
injuries, although this distinction was not emphasized in the opinion. Thus,
it seems that no clear rule respecting disclaimers of warranty by retailers has
yet evolved in Florida, although a manufacturer's liability cannot be dis-
claimed. The cautious attitude of the Florida courts compares unfavorably
with the unequivocal rejection of the manufacturer's warranty by the New
Jersey court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.5 0
141. See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability- With a Close Look at Section
4024 and the Code, 36 TrNN. L. REv. 439, 448 (1969).
142. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
143. 201 So. 2d at 443.
144. 207 So. 2d 67 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
145. E.g., Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
146. E.g., Hardee v. Gordon Thompson Chevrolet, Inc., 154 So. 2d 174 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1963); Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962). See also Posey v.
Ford Motor Co., 128 So. 2d 149 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
147. 211 So. 2d 576 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
148. Id. at 580.
149. Id. at 579.
150. 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198,
188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d
919 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber Inc., 252
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The Uniform Commercial Code151 provides a method for excluding or
limiting warranties. 1 52 The Desandolo case cited this provision but did not
apply it, since the Code had not yet become effective in Florida. The question
finally arose in Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman.153 In this case, due to a defect
in the wiring, the plaintiff's new automobile caught fire, and the plaintiff
sued under an implied warranty. The defendant replied that all implied
warranties were excluded under the terms of the Code. The court disagreed,
holding that the manufacturer was not a "seller" to the ultimate consumer
under the Code and thus could not make use of its disclaimer provisions."4
This reasoning invites the conclusion that retailers may exclude implied war-
ranties under the provisions of section 2-316 even when personal injuries are
concerned. Whether such a result could be upheld by the Florida courts
remains to be seen.
UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCTS
It has been suggested that much of the doctrinal complexity of products
liability could be eliminated by the adoption of strict liability in tort as the
sole basis of liability. Even under this approach, however, there are difficul-
ties when unavoidably unsafe products are concerned. 55 Florida courts, de-
ciding cases concerning such products as cigarettes, drugs, and blood for
transfusions have stopped just short of adopting strict liability and have
continued to apply implied warranty theory.
Cigarettes 6 were involved in the celebrated case of Green v. American
Tobacco Co.157 At one stage in the complex history of this case, pursuant
to a statutory certification procedure, 58 the federal court of appeals presented
to the Florida supreme court the question of whether the law of Florida re-
quired knowledge of the harmful nature of smoking tobacco for manufac-
Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961).
151. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316.
152. See Franklin, supra note 132, at 992-1016; Murray, The Consumer and the Code:
A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 11, 32-37 (1968).
153. 227 So. 2d 246 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
154. Id. at 249.
155. See James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on En-
terprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550 (1966); Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unfore-
seeable Risks in Manufacturer's Liability Under Implied Warranty, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 515
(1963); Comment, Strict Liability for Drug Manufacturers: Public Policy Misconceived, 13
STAN. L. REV. 645 (1961).
156. Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Explored, 34 S.
CAL. L. REV. 399 (1961).
157. 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); 391 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1968); 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); 304 F.2d 70 (5th
Cir. 1962); 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). See Comment, Torts: Products Liability - Test of
Actual Safety in Cigarette Cases, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 351 (1968).
158. FLA. STAT. §25.031 (1969). See Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal
Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine,
16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (1962); Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Im-
practical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717 (1969).
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turer liability under the implied warranty of merchantability.159 The Florida
court responded 6° that "our decisions conclusively establish the principle
that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge of a defective or whole-
some condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied
warranty."' 6 The court indicated that it had expressly overruled in Carter
v. Hector Supply Co.:6 2 the lower court's holding that "proof of actual or
implied knowledge of a defect on the part of a [defendant] is essential to his
liability on an implied warranty."'' 3 The court also stated no reasonable dis-
tinction could be made between the physical and practical impossibility of
obtaining knowledge of the dangerous condition and scientific inability re-
sulting from a current lack of human knowledge or skill. 64 Although the
opinion specifically dealt with tobacco, a product for personal consumption,
it contained no limitation to such products. Other decisions have held that
cigarette manufacturers were not liable for unforeseen side effects, such as
cancer, which were not foreseeable. 65
The broad language in Green has since proved somewhat difficult to recon-
cile with subsequent decisions. In McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co.66 the plaintiff
brought an action against two retail druggists for injuries caused from taking
a drug. The issue was whether a retail druggist impliedly warranted the
product he dispensed pursuant to a doctor's prescription where the injury
resulted from the nature of the product itself. Factually, this differed from
the food cases, since there was no adulteration of the drug.167 The district
court of appeal refused to hold the defendants liable, since the prescription
was filled in accordance with its directions and sealed packets were used. The
court concluded that the warranty of fitness was inapplicable, since the plain-
tiff relied on the doctor, not the druggist, for selection of the drug; the war-
ranty of merchantability was found to be absent because the product was
available to the general public only through prescription.
In support of its position the McLeod court referred to the strict liability
provisions of the Restatements without expressly recognizing them as
159. 154 So. 2d at 170.
160. The court really asked the wrong question. The proper question would have been
whether there was a breach of warranty when a product in common use has inherent
dangers that cannot be eliminated. See Prosser, supra note 128, at 167.
161. 154 So. 2d at 170.
162. 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
163. 154 So. 2d at 171.
164. Id.
165. E.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Ross v.
Philip Morris, 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d
19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). But see Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). See also White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Manu-
facturers and Assumption of Risk, 29 LA. L. RFv. 589 (1969).
166. 174 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 167 So. 2d 901 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1964).
167. The court also determined that §402A of the REsrATEMENT oF ToRTs was not ap-
plicable. 174 So. 2d at 739.
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binding.168 The court noted that comment (k)- 9 contained an exception for
new and experimental drugs that, because of lack of time and opportunity
for sufficient medical experience, could not be considered absolutely safe
although available experience justified the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.17o The court limited the scope
of implied warranty with respect to prescription drugs to an assurance that:
(1) the druggist had compounded the drug prescribed; (2) he had used due
care in filling the prescription; (3) proper methods had been used in the
compounding process; and (4) the drug had not been adulterated.'7 ' The
McLeod case reflected the practical difficulties of applying implied warranty
theory to certain products.' 72
Another troublesome group of cases' 73 deals with blood transfusions' z
The leading decision in Florida was Russell v. Community Blood Bank' 75
168. Id. See also Note, Products Liability, Doctrinal Problems and the Restatement's
Answer, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 421 (1964).
169. 174 So. 2d at 739. "There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs .... Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which
for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription
of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience
as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recog-
nizable risk. The seller of such products, again, with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
170. If the product is safe for normal use, there is no liability when it injures the
rare abnormal user. See Noel, The Duty To Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 331 (1959).
171. 174 So. 2d at 739.
172. One result of the McLeod decision is the reemergence of the sealed container
doctrine. Presumably the rule will be limited to certain classes of drugs.
173. E.g., Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Perlmutter
v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp.
Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23
Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
174. Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23 ARX. L.
REV. 236 (1969); Haut & Alter, Blood Transfusions- Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
557 (1969); Sweatt, Serum Hepatitis Through Blood Transfusions: A Wrong Without a
Remedy?, 24 Sw. L.J. 305 (1970); Note, Products Liability -Determination of Liability of
Hospitals and Blood Banks for Hepatitis Transmitted Through Transfusion, 18 KAN. L. REv.
119 (1969); Note, Products Liability -The Blood Transfusion as a Sale, 11 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 1004 (1970).
175. 185 So. 2d 749 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 196 So. 2d 115
(Fla. 1967); see Comment, Sales: Implied Warranties in Blood Transfusions, 20 U. FLA. L.
REv. 110 (1967); Comment, Blood Banks, Bad Blood, and Implied Warranty, 22 U. MsAMi
L. REv. 479 (1966).
[Vol. XXIV
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN FLORIDA
where the plaintiff contracted hepatitis through a transfusion of tainted blood.
It was admitted that "the defect of serum hepatitis virus cannot be eliminated
regardless of the amount of inspection or care."'176 Faced with the holding
in the Green case, the court turned from implied warranty to the Restatement
of Torts, section 402A, to hold that the plaintiff could proceed against the
blood bank only if he could show his injuries "were caused by the failure to
detect or remove a deleterious substance capable of detection or removal."
'1 77
The court admitted that this approach resembled negligence more closely
than warranty. Although Russell had rejected any distinction between
sale and service,17 subsequent cases resurrected this vestige of the law of
sales by holding that transfusions of blood by a hospital were to be con-
sidered a service to which no implied warranties attached,179 while those of
blood banks were considered sales and therefore subject to implied warranty'8 0
A recently enacted statute has apparently settled the matter by declaring that
implied warranties will not attach to transfusions of blood by either hospitals
or blood banks where the defect is not detectable.' 8 '
It should be emphasized, however, that when the manufacturer of an un-
avoidably unsafe product knows or should know there is danger to a sub-
stantial number of persons, even though they constitute only a small per-
centage of the population, he is under a duty to give warning; 2 after he
gives the warning, however, he does not become liable merely because he has
sold the product. 8 3
STmRcT LIABILITY FOR DEFECrv PRODUcrrs
Many commentators have urged the courts to abandon the concept of
warranty and base products liability exclusively upon strict liability in
tort. 8 4 This view was adopted in 1963 by the American Law Institute. 8 5
176. 185 So. 2d at 753.
177. Id. at 755.
178. Id. The leading case making such a distinction is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp.,
308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). See also Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App.
281, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 270
Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Hubbell v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 Misc. 2d
847, 260 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp.,
12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d
774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127
N.W.2d 50 (1964).
179. E.g., White v. Sarasota County & Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1968).
180. E.g., Holder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
181. FLA. STAT. §672.316 (5) (1969).
182. E.g., Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958); see Dillard & Hart,
Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn, 41 VA. L. Rav. 145 (1955).
183. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 800-01 (1966).
184. E.g., Epstein, Strict Liability in Tort: A Modest Proposal, 70 W. VA. L. Rxv. 1, 11
(1967); Noel, Manufacturers of Products -The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L.
Rzv. 963, 1017 (1957); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
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Justice Traynor of California in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.186
followed this approach and allowed recovery in tort against a manufacturer
despite the plaintiff's lack of privity and his failure to give timely notice of
the breach as required by the Uniform Sales Act.1 8 7 The Greenman case was
well received 8 ss and is now thought to be the majority position.8 9
Advocates of strict liability have maintained that this doctrine will en-
courage manufacturers to improve the safety of their products 90 and will per-
mit the distribution of loss among the consuming public instead of upon the
injured victim alone. This risk-spreading rationale was first proposed by
Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.19 and later restated in
Greenman892
Although some courts have failed to distinguish between implied warranty
and strict liability,193 the two concepts are distinct - one is transactional while
the other is behavioral.' D4 Strict liability, however, is not absolute liability;95
where implied warranty requires that the plaintiff must prove that the product
was not merchantable or fit for the purpose sold, strict liability demands that
he must show the article was defective 96 and his injury was proximately
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960). But see Plant, Strict Liability for Injuries Caused
by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REy. 938, 940-48 (1957); Smyser,
Product Liability and the American Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J.
343, 359 (1965).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965): "Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer. (1) One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller."
186. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
187. UNIFORM SALES Acr §49.
188. Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Garthwait v. Burgio,
153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d
182 (1965); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Wights
v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965).
189. See W. PROSSER, TORTS §97, at 678 (4th ed. 1971).
190. Epstein, supra note 184, at 16-17; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366 (1965).
191. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-64, 150 P.2d 436, 441-42 (1944).
192. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 647, 701 (1963). See also Rapson,
Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial
Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692, 723 (1965).
193. Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability - With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 443 (1969).
194. McCurdy, Warranty Privity in Sales of Goods, I HOUSTON L. REV. 201, 225 (1964).
195. Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 924, 925
(1969).
196. Keeton, Products Liability -Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REv. 855, 858 (1963); Traynor, supra note 190, at 367. One commen-
[Vol. XXlV
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN FLORIDA
caused by the defect.97 One decision has even held that the defect must have
been the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries.19S In addition, the Restatement
requires that the product be used for its ordinary use. 199 In spite of its ap-
parent improvement over implied warranty, the strict liability approach is
not entirely free of difficulties. Problems have arisen, for example, in con-
nection with the liability of retailers, the rights of injured bystanders, and the
matter of wholly economic losses due to defective products.
California, which had decided the landmark Greenman case, in Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 20 0 became the first state to extend strict liability to
retailers. Most strict liability jurisdictions immediately followed, 201 and it
now seems likely that retailers as well as manufacturers and wholesalers will
be subject to strict liability for defective products. 20 2
Another problem area is the status of the nonuser who is injured by a
defective product. The Restatement provides that the seller shall be liable
to "users and consumers." 20 3 Although these terms are liberally defined in
comment j,204 the American Law Institute has declined to indicate whether sec-
tion 402A may apply to persons other than consumers or users.20 5 Arguably,
courts will apply strict liability only to nonusers whose presence is foreseeable.
There is a split of authority on whether strict liability in tort is available
to the plaintiff in the absence of personal injuries206 New Jersey, in Santor v.
A & M Karaghousian, Inc.,20 7 allowed recovery under strict liability for eco-
nomic losses, while California limited such cases to contractual remedies in
tator has suggested that the criterion for establishing that the article is defective for
purposes of imposing strict liability in tort upon the seller is the same as the requirement
of merchantability under §2-314 (2) (c) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. Rapson, supra
note 192, at 700.
197. Sandler, Strict Liability and the the Need for Legislation, 53 VA. L. REv. 1509,
1509-10 (1967); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 22 (1965).
198. Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968). See also Comment,
Products Liability -A Limitation on the Doctrine of Strict Liability of §402A, 72 DICK. L.
REv. 543 (1968).
199. RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965). See also Note, Products Liability:
A Synopsis, 30 OHio ST. L.J. 551, 565 (1969).
200. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 291 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
201. E.g., Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); see
Comment, Tort -Strict Liability for Retailers?, 45 WAsH. L. REv. 431, 433 n.13 (1970).
202. REsrATMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment f at 350 (1965).
203. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §402A (1) (1965).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment I at 354 (1965).
205. RE.STATEmENr (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment o at 348 (1965); Dickerson, supra
note 193, at 442; Note, supra note 199, at 564.
206. See Note, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products: Continuing Con-
troversy Over the Law To Be Applied, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1681 (1966); Note, Economic Loss
in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLUm. L. REv. 917 (1966).
207. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See also Note, Privity Eliminated as a Require-
ment in Loss-of-Bargain Products Liability Cases -The Effects of Santor, 19 RUTGRS L.
REv. 715 (1965).
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Seely v. White Motor Co.20s At the present time it is uncertain which position
will ultimately prevail.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The law of products liability has been further complicated by the enact-
ment in most states of the Uniform Commercial Code.209 The warranty pro-
visions of the Code, which are set forth in sections 2-312 through 2-318, do
not depart significantly from the warranty law developed under various sec-
tions of the Uniform Sales Act.2 10 Nevertheless, the draftsmen realized that
products liability was a rapidly developing field and their official comments
indicated that the Code was not intended to restrict this development. Thus,
in a number of areas the Code was consistent with subsequent judicial de-
cisions under the strict liability in tort doctrine.2 1 ' Quite apart from the
Code's general approach to products liability, however, there are two specific
objections: the first concerns the status of privity under the Code212 while the
second relates to its notice and disclaimer provisions.
The Code takes no position on privity except in section 2-318,213 where
only designated "third party beneficiaries" are expressly placed within the
warranty protection.21 4 To avoid any retention of privity Utah and California
refused to adopt section 2-318,2 15 Connecticut codified comment 3 of the
section,2 16 and Virginia enacted a substitute version of section 2-318 that
eliminated privity entirely.2 17 Notwithstanding these actions, it has been
argued that the removal of privity would be inconsistent with the basically
contractual nature of the Code, and warranty would then become a hybrid
form of action without a firm basis in either tort or contract. 218
The notice and disclaimer provisions of the Code have also raised serious
questions.2: 9 Although the courts have sometimes objected to a requirement
that the seller be notified of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time,
some provision for notice is necessary so that the manufacturer of the goods
can correct any design and processing deficiencies or recall similarly defective
208. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
209. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defec-
tive Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966).
210. UNIFORM SALES AcT §§12-15.
211. See Rapson, supra note 192, at 695.
212. Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 61 VA. L. REv. 804, 815-16 (1965).
213. Franklin, supra note 209, at 999-1000.
214. Speidel, supra note 212, at 815-16.
215. See Speidel, supra note 212, at 817-18; Comment, Tort Action for Strict Liability
in Products Liability Cases, 26 WASH & LEE L. REv. 143, 145 (1969).
216. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §42a-2-318 (Supp. 1971).
217. VA. CODE ANN. §8.2-318 (1965). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §155-2-318 (1963).
218. Comment, supra note 215, at 149 n.31. No substantial purpose seems to be served
by the retention of the privity doctrine.
219. Id. at 147.
[Vol. XXIV
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN FLORIDA
products.220 The Uniform Sales Act221 permitted the seller to disclaim any
warranty and the Code has continued this policy, although in somewhat
restricted form.222 The Code allows the courts under section 2-802 to invali-
date unconscionable disclaimers. In addition, a limitation of consequential
damages for personal injuries in the case of consumer goods is held to be
prima fade unconscionable under section 2-319 (8).223 Nevertheless, comment
3 to section 2-719 states that "the seller in all cases is free to disclaim war-
ranties in the manner provided in section 2-316." This implies that such dis-
claimers will not necessarily be regarded as unconscionable under the Code.
224
A Florida court, however, has already refused to allow manufacturers to dis-
claim an implied warranty under the Code's provisions.225
One solution to these difficulties is to retain common law theories of lia-
bility along with the Code, thus providing the injured consumer with a
choice of remedies. 2 26 This approach was contemplated by the proponents of
strict liability227 and has been utilized by some courts. 228 This method, how-
ever, has been condemned because some of the Code's provisions relate ex-
plicitly to consumer sales229 and the Code's special treatment of personal
injuries- 0 strongly indicates that other sections also pertain to the ultimate
consumer. Since it is a serious matter for a court to ignore a whole body of
statutory law that is directly concerned with a particular problem and to
substitute a wholly distinct set of principles, some legislative guidance may
be desirable to resolve this question.
CONCLUSION
The law of products liability in Florida prior to the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code may be summarized as follows: Manufacturers
were liable under implied warranty to all users or consumers of their products,
regardless of privity. Retailers were liable under implied warranty to con-
sumers in the absence of privity only for food, products specially designed
for third persons, and possibly inherently dangerous products. Neither
manufacturers nor retailers were liable to nonusers except in the case of
inherently dangerous products. Special rules limited liability with respect
to unavoidably unsafe products, while disclaimers of implied warranties
220. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YAL LJ. 887, 905-06 (1967).
221. UNIFoRM SALFS Acr §71.
222. Prosser, supra note 183, at 831.
228. See Note, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products: Continuing Con-
troversy Over the Law To Be Applied, 54 CALu. L. Rxv. 1681 (1966).
224. Rapson, supra note 192, at 710.
225. Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
226. Note, supra note 207, at 784.
227. Wade, supra note 197, at 11.
228. E.g., Suvada v. White Motor Car Co., 82 IlL. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 448, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
229. Franklin, supra note 209, at 995.
280. See UNEFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-818, -719.
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were ineffective as to manufacturers. No substantial changes appear to have
come about by the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. In particular
the question of retailer liability, in the absence of privity to those other than
the designated classes in section 2-318, is presently undecided.
Florida products liability law is unnecessarily complicated to the extent
that it is based upon outdated theories of warranty. Florida should consider
discarding the warranty approach entirely in favor of strict liability in tort.
This approach would free the courts of the doctrinal tangle associated with
implied warranty and would permit future developments on a more rational
basis. Although not without its own problems, section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts represents the best statement of strict liability principles. The Uni-
form Commercial Code should not be permitted to hinder this development
by restricting the liability of either manufacturers or retailers.
